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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal we are faced with the onerous task of 
determining whether the district court, upon petition for 
writ of habeas corpus, erred in granting the unconditional 
release of one convicted of first degree murder by a state 
trial judge. Under Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982), 
the district court is required to dismiss a federal habeas 
petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254 which contains 
both unexhausted and exhausted claims. Because wefind 
the petitioner has not yet pursued her remedies under the 
Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. S 9542 et seq. (West 1997 Supp.), her federal habeas 
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petition includes unexhausted claims and, hence, the result 
here is dictated by Rose v. Lundy, supra . Thus, we will 
remand this case to the district court with an order to 
dismiss the petition without prejudice so that the petitioner 
can first present her unexhausted claims to the appropriate 
Pennsylvania state court. 
 
I.1 
 
Laurie Show became romantically involved with Lisa 
Lambert's boyfriend, Lawrence "Butch" Yunkin, for a brief 
period in June of 1991. Thereafter, Show incurred the 
wrath of Lambert, who accosted Show on several occasions. 
On the morning of December 20, 1991, Show was brutally 
murdered. Lambert and an accomplice, Tabitha Buck, were 
subsequently charged with criminal homicide for the 
murder of Show.2 Buck was convicted of second degree 
murder by a jury of her peers; Yunkin, in exchange for his 
truthful testimony against Lambert, pled guilty to hindering 
apprehension.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We note, as a preliminary matter, that Lambertfiled a motion to 
dismiss this appeal on the basis that since the district court found she 
was actually innocent of first degree murder, the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment bars the Commonwealth's appeal. By 
separate order, we will deny this motion. As we make clear in this 
opinion, the district court erred in reaching the issue of Lambert's 
actual 
innocence. Accordingly, we do not give weight to the district court's 
factual findings in this appeal. Moreover, we are plainly authorized to 
review the final order of the district court in a habeas case pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 2253(a). Furthermore, a finding of actual innocence, as that 
term has come to be used in federal habeas corpus jurisprudence, is not 
the equivalent of a finding of not guilty by a jury or by a court at a 
bench trial. We find, therefore, that the Double Jeopardy Clause does 
not bar the Commonwealth's appeal. 
 
2. At the time of her arrest, Lambert was six months pregnant with 
Yunkin's child. 
 
3. Several weeks after Lambert's murder trial was concluded; the 
Commonwealth determined that Yunkin had perjured himself at 
Lambert's trial. Consequently, Yunkin breached the plea agreement and 
the Commonwealth charged him with third degree murder to which he 
pled nolo contendere. 
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On July 20, 1992, after a seven-day bench trial in the 
Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, 
Lambert was convicted of first degree murder and criminal 
conspiracy. Subsequently, Lambert was sentenced to life 
imprisonment by the trial court. Lambert, through her trial 
counsel, Roy Shirk, Esq., filed a Motion in Arrest of 
Judgment and for New Trial, and Additional Reasons for 
Post-Trial Motions, raising various allegations of trial error 
and prosecutorial misconduct.4 On July 19, 1994, the trial 
court issued an Opinion and Order denying Lambert's post- 
trial motions. No appeal was taken from this order. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The issues raised in the first set of post-verdict motions filed by Roy 
Shirk, Esq., included: 
 
       Error to deny defendant's motion for change of venue; 
 
       Error to deny defendant's motion for sanctions; 
 
       Error to allow Tabitha Buck's statement into evidence; 
 
       Error to allow the trier of fact to take notes during trial and 
       potentially to use them during deliberation; 
 
       Error to affirm and read the Commonwealth's points of charge Nos. 
       3 and 4; 
 
       Error not to grant a mistrial when the request for supplemental 
       discovery of Laura Thomas was not granted; 
 
       Error not to grant a mistrial when the request for supplemental 
       discovery of Hazel Show was not granted; 
 
       Error not to grant a mistrial when the request for supplemental 
       discovery of Richard Kleinhans was not granted; 
 
       Error not to grant a mistrial when the prosecution withheld 
evidence 
       that a jergo was discarded and that they were aware of its 
location; 
 
       Error to qualify Dr. Penades as an expert in forensic pathology 
since 
       he was not board certified; 
 
       Error not to grant a mistrial when the prosecution withheld from 
       discovery a portion of Yunkin's statement of February 4, 1992; 
 
       Error not to grant a mistrial when the Assistant District Attorney 
       asked witness Samuel J. Golub two questions beyond his area of 
       expertise; and 
        Insufficient evidence existed to sustain the verdict. 
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Subsequently, Lambert, through new counsel, Jules 
Epstein, Esq., filed a Motion for a New Trial based on 
allegations of after-discovered evidence5  and ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel.6 An evidentiary hearing on the 
new motion was conducted over a two-day period in 
November of 1994. On March 14, 1995, the state trial court 
denied Lambert's motion for post-verdict relief. In June of 
1995, Lambert appealed the judgment of sentence imposed 
by the state trial court to the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania, raising essentially the same claims regarding 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel and after-discovered 
evidence.7 A three-judge panel of the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania affirmed the judgment of sentence on January 
4, 1996. In her direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court filed on February 2, 1996, Lambert again raised the 
same claims.8 Lambert's petition for allowance of appeal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The after-discovered evidence consisted of the testimony of Yunkin in 
a court proceeding subsequent to Lambert's trial in which he stated he 
was aware of the plans to harm Laurie Show; and, Yunkin's admission 
of his involvement in the murder during the plea colloquy, which also 
took place subsequent to Lambert's trial, resulting in a plea of nolo 
contendere to third degree murder. 
 
6. Lambert alleged trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present 
evidence of good character/reputation; failing to present evidence and 
witnesses to substantiate her testimony that she had been physically 
and psychologically abused by Yunkin; failing to produce evidence that 
Commonwealth witness Laura Thomas was on juvenile probation which 
was crucial to the credibility determination; presenting a witness who 
testified that Laurie Show's claim of date rape against Yunkin was false; 
failing to present evidence of bad reputation for the veracity of witness 
Laura Thomas; failing to move to suppress Lambert's inculpatory 
statement to the police; failing to seek a new trial based upon new 
evidence of Yunkin's nolo contendere plea to third degree murder; and, 
in failing to impeach Yunkin with his statements to the police that he 
knew of the plan to harm the victim before he dropped Lambert and 
Buck off at Show's condominium. 
 
7. In her appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Lambert argued her 
counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce evidence of her good 
character and of the abuse inflicted upon her by Yunkin; Lambert also 
raised the after-discovered evidence of Yunkin's breach of his plea 
agreement and perjury. 
 
8. See note 7, supra. 
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was subsequently denied on July 2, 1996. Lambert did not 
seek collateral review of any of her claims through the 
Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act. 
 
Lambert instituted the present federal habeas corpus 
action by filing a pro se writ of habeas corpus on 
September 12, 1996. The district court subsequently 
appointed counsel to represent Lambert and directed 
counsel to file an amended petition, which they did on 
January 3, 1997. Lambert's first amended petition for writ 
of habeas corpus incorporated the claims previously 
presented to the state courts, but went further, advancing 
the following grounds for relief: (1) Lambert was actually 
innocent and no credible evidence supported the 
prosecution's theory of her guilt or the findings of the state 
trial court; (2) the misconduct9 of the prosecution and the 
police created a situation of manifest injustice; (3) after- 
discovered evidence10 created manifest injustice; and, (4) 
trial counsel was ineffective in over 35 separate ways. In its 
Answer to the First Amended Petition, the Commonwealth 
responded that Lambert was not entitled to federal review 
at this time since she had failed to exhaust her state court 
remedies and had committed insurmountable procedural 
default. In the alternative, the Commonwealth argued that 
Lambert's petition should be denied on the merits. Further, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The alleged misconduct includes altering Lambert's statement to the 
police; creating a false crime scene photograph to discredit her; 
knowingly presenting perjured testimony and failing to take remedial 
measures after the perjury was confirmed; knowingly presenting "expert" 
testimony that was scientifically incredible while tampering with the 
defense's expert; altering evidence and witness statements; failing to 
disclose Brady and Giglio evidence; and "losing" other exculpatory 
evidence. 
 
10. The after-discovered evidence allegedly consists of alterations of 
Lambert's statement; alteration of crime scene evidence; scientific 
testing 
of clothing worn by Yunkin; photographs of the crime scene which 
revealed additional writing in blood by the victim that exculpates 
Lambert; autopsy report notes revealing the time of the victim's death; 
injuries incurred by the "real" killers, Yunkin and Buck; testing of blood 
found on the victim's ring; statements made by Yunkin and Buck to 
their friends; and, the subsequent admission by the prosecution that the 
primary witness against Lambert--and one of the"real" killers--had 
committed perjury at Lambert's trial. 
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the Commonwealth expressly stated in its Answer that it 
was not waiving the exhaustion requirement in any manner.11 
 
Despite the Commonwealth's objections to Lambert's 
petition on the grounds of exhaustion and procedural 
default, the district court determined that it would allow 
broad discovery and would conduct an evidentiary hearing 
on Lambert's claims of actual innocence and prosecutorial 
misconduct while, at the same time, considering the 
Commonwealth's procedural claims of exhaustion and 
procedural default. The district court denied the 
Commonwealth's objection that the evidentiary hearing was 
prohibited by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), codified at 28 U.S.C. S 2241 
et seq., citing the highly unusual circumstances of this 
case. The evidentiary hearing commenced on March 31, 
1997, and, after fourteen days of testimony, the district 
court entered an order granting the writ, releasing Lambert 
from custody, and barring the Commonwealth from 
conducting a retrial of Lambert. 
 
The district court issued its Order and Memorandum 
Opinion on April 21, 1997.12 Lambert v. Blackwell, 962 
F.Supp. 1521 (E.D. Pa. 1997). The court found that the 
1995 amendment to the Pennsylvania Post Conviction 
Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.S 9543, which 
eliminated the waiver exception for actual innocence or 
procedural default (former sections 9543(a)(3)(ii) and (iii)), 
left Lambert without a state forum in which to raise her 
claims of error. The district court interpreted the 
Pennsylvania legislature's elimination of the actual 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The district court found, however, that the Commonwealth waived its 
exhaustion and procedural default arguments at the evidentiary hearing 
when counsel stated that relief was "warranted" in this case. N.T. at 
2703, April 16, 1997. In so holding, the district court did not recognize 
that the Commonwealth withdrew this concession the very next day. In 
any event, the Commonwealth maintains that any acquiescence it may 
have made regarding relief did not result in an express waiver of the 
exhaustion issue. See also note 28, infra. 
 
12. In finding that Lambert was actually innocent of the murder of 
Laurie Show, the district court did not address the third and fourth 
grounds raised in Lambert's habeas petition regarding after-discovered 
evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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innocence and procedural default exceptions to waiver "as 
an advertent decision after the Supreme Court's decision in 
Schlup [v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995),] to place those issues 
squarely into the federal forum." Lambert, 962 F.Supp. at 
1553. Thus, the district court concluded that Lambert 
exhausted all of the claims presented in her federal habeas 
proceeding, with the exception of the after-discovered 
evidence which "expand[ed] the degree of the violations" 
brought to the attention of the state trial judge or confirmed 
Lambert's contention that she is actually innocent. Id. 
 
The court further opined that to the extent there may be 
claims which a Pennsylvania court might view as not being 
waived, the state proceedings would be ineffective to protect 
Lambert's rights if the district court dismissed the petition. 
Id. at 1554. Moreover, the court found that if it were to 
dismiss this case as a mixed petition pursuant to Rose v. 
Lundy, supra, "on the suspicion that perhaps its reading of 
the PCRA was wrong," then Lambert would be deemed to 
have taken her one bite of the apple under the AEDPA. Id. 
Consequently, in order for Lambert to return to federal 
court, the district court opined, she would need the 
approval of the court of appeals and denial of such 
application was unreviewable by the Supreme Court. The 
district court felt that under these extraordinary 
circumstances, such a result was constitutionally  
intolerable.13 Id. 
 
Finally, the district court explained that in such an 
extraordinary case, the principles of comity allowed it to 
excuse total exhaustion or procedural default in the face of 
a manifestly unjust incarceration.14 Id. In any event, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Subsequent to the issuance of the district court's opinion, we decided 
Christy v. Horn, 115 F.3d 201, 208 (3d Cir. 1997), holding that "when a 
prior petition has been dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust 
state remedies, [authorization from the court] is [not] necessary and the 
petitioner may file his petition in the district court as if it were the 
first 
such filing." 
 
14. At a status conference held on February 13, 1997, prior to the 
evidentiary hearing, the court, after articulating its concerns with the 
exhaustion issue, opined that the better approach was to analyze the 
petitioner's claims under the doctrines of actual innocence and manifest 
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court found that the Commonwealth's concession at the 
evidentiary hearing that Lambert was entitled to some relief 
effected a waiver of the exhaustion objection. 
 
The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal on 
April 22, 1997. We have jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1291 and 2253.15 In a federal 
habeas corpus proceeding, we exercise plenary review of the 
district court's legal conclusions and apply a clearly 
erroneous standard to the court's factual findings. Caswell 
v. Ryan, 953 F.2d 853, 857 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Bond v. 
Fulcomer, 864 F.2d 306, 309 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
 
II. 
 
We note at the outset that the parties do not dispute that 
Lambert's petition includes claims which were not 
presented to the state court.16 Unlike the district court, 
however, we cannot dispense with consideration of the 
exhaustion and procedural default claims in favor of 
reaching the merits of Lambert's claim of actual innocence.17 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
injustice based upon prosecutorial misconduct, which are derived from 
the Due Process Clause and not from any statute (such as the PCRA). 
The district court thus intimated that it was avoiding the exhaustion 
issue by proceeding to a due process analysis. The court further stated 
that while it agreed with the general requirements of the AEDPA 
regarding evidentiary hearings and unexhausted claims, this case 
involved highly unusual circumstances and, thus, those provisions did 
not apply. 
 
15. Because the Commonwealth has taken the appeal in this proceeding, 
a certificate of appealability is not required as a prerequisite to our 
exercising appellate jurisdiction. Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). 
 
16. Lambert argues in her brief, however, that since she has waived the 
non-exhausted claims in state court, she has thus exhausted her state 
remedies. As explained below, we do not agree with Lambert that the 
non-exhausted claims were necessarily waived in state court. 
 
17. We recognize that a panel of this court, on a motion by the 
respondents for a stay of Lambert's release pending the appeal, 
concluded that the respondents failed to show that they were likely to 
succeed in their argument that the petition should be denied because of 
Lambert's failure to exhaust her state court remedies. Of course, that 
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Rather, we find that Supreme Court precedent and the 
AEDPA mandate that prior to determining the merits of her 
petition, we must consider whether Lambert is required to 
present her unexhausted claims to the Pennsylvania courts. 
We turn, therefore, to a discussion of exhaustion of state 
claims under the AEDPA. 
 
A. 
 
It is axiomatic that a federal habeas court may not grant 
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a person 
incarcerated from a judgment of a state court unless the 
petitioner has first exhausted the remedies available in the 
state courts. 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b)(1)(A); Toulson v. Beyer, 
987 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1993). The exhaustion requirement is 
excused, however, where no available state corrective 
process exists or the particular circumstances of the case 
render the state process ineffective to protect the 
petitioner's rights. 28 U.S.C. SS 2254(b)(1)(B)(I) and (ii). A 
petitioner will not be deemed to have exhausted the 
available state court remedies so long as she has the right 
under state law to raise, by any available procedure, the 
question presented. 28 U.S.C. S 2254(c). A petitioner who 
has raised an issue on direct appeal, however, is not 
required to raise it again in a state post-conviction 
proceeding. Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, Delaware 
County, Pennsylvania, 959 F.2d 1227, 1230 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(citing Swanger v. Zimmermann, 750 F.2d 291, 295 (3d Cir. 
1984)). Thus, the federal habeas claim must have been 
"fairly presented" to the state courts, i.e., it must be the 
substantial equivalent of that presented to the state courts. 
Id. at 1231 (citations omitted). In addition, the state court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
inherently tentative conclusion, based on a record less complete than 
that before us and not reached after the opportunity for the intensive 
study available to a merits panel, is not binding on this panel. See Third 
Circuit I.O.P. 9.1 (only the holding of a panel in a published opinion is 
binding on subsequent panels). See also United States v. Houser, 804 
F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir. 1986). In any event, the motions panel did not 
preclude the respondents from raising the exhaustion issue. Rather, it 
merely opined that they were not likely to succeed on it. In fact, upon 
fuller presentation and consideration, they have succeeded. 
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must have available to it the same method of legal analysis 
as that to be employed in federal court. Id. The habeas 
petitioner carries the burden of proving exhaustion of all 
available state remedies. Toulson, 987 F.2d at 987. The 
exhaustion requirement does not foreclose federal relief, but 
merely postpones it. Id. at 986. 
 
The Supreme Court has made clear that a section 2254 
petition which includes unexhausted as well as exhausted 
claims, i.e., a mixed petition, must be dismissed without 
prejudice. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court analyzed the policies 
underlying section 2254 since it found that Congress's 
intent was unclear from the statute or legislative history. Id. 
at 516-17. In endorsing rigorous enforcement of the total 
exhaustion rule, the Court acknowledged the preference 
among federal jurists to allow state courts the initial 
opportunity to review and correct alleged violations of 
federal constitutional rights. This preference is derived from 
principles of comity.18 Id.  at 518. The Court further noted 
that adoption of a total exhaustion rule causes a reduction 
in piecemeal litigation, thereby increasing the likelihood 
that all claims will be reviewed in a single proceeding. Id. at 
520. Finally, the Court observed that the prisoner's interest 
in obtaining speedy relief in federal court on his claims 
would not be unreasonably impaired by requiring total 
exhaustion. Id. at 520-22. Thus, Lundy  teaches that if the 
petitioner fails to satisfy the exhaustion requirement prior 
to filing a federal habeas petition and none of the 
exceptions apply, the federal court is precluded from 
granting habeas relief to the petitioner. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. The doctrine of comity " `teaches that one court should defer action 
on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another 
sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the 
litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter.' " Rose v. 
Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982) (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 
204 (1950)). Indeed, we opined in Toulson v. Beyer, 987 F.2d 984, 986 
(3d Cir. 1993), that requiring exhaustion of state remedies "addresses 
federalism and comity concerns by `afford[ing] the state courts a 
meaningful opportunity to consider allegations of legal error without 
interference from the federal judiciary.' " (Citations omitted.) 
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Five years later, the Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987). In 
Granberry, the district court had dismissed the federal 
habeas petition upon the state's motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When 
the petitioner appealed, the state for the first time 
interposed the defense that the petitioner had not 
exhausted his state remedies. The petitioner responded by 
arguing that the state waived this defense by failing to raise 
it in the district court. The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to consider whether the state's failure to raise the 
exhaustion defense in the district court constituted a 
waiver of that claim in the court of appeals. 481 U.S. at 
130. 
 
The Court held in Granberry that where the state has 
failed to raise, in the district court, an arguably meritorious 
nonexhaustion defense, through inadvertence or otherwise, 
the court of appeals may appropriately examine the 
nonexhaustion issue anew. Id. at 134. In determining 
whether the interests of comity and federalism were better 
served by addressing the merits despite non-exhaustion, 
the Supreme Court delineated the following standard: 
 
       If, for example, the case presents an issue on which an 
       unresolved question of fact or of state law might have 
       an important bearing, both comity and judicial 
       efficiency may make it appropriate for the court to 
       insist on complete exhaustion to make sure that it may 
       ultimately review the issue on a fully informed basis. 
       On the other hand, if it is perfectly clear that the 
       applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim, 
       the interests of the petitioner, the warden, the state 
       attorney general, the state courts, and the federal 
       courts will be well served even if the State fails to raise 
       the exhaustion defense, the district court denies the 
       habeas petition, and the court of appeals affirms the 
       judgment of the district court . . . . 
 
Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. at 134-35. Thus, we learn 
from Granberry that where a state fails to raise a 
nonexhaustion defense in the district court, courts of 
appeals should consider whether, under the particular facts 
and circumstances presented, the interests of justice would 
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be served by addressing the merits of the habeas petition if 
it is clear the petitioner has failed to state a colorable 
federal claim, or by requiring exhaustion. Id.  at 136. We 
emphasize, however, our previous holding that Granberry 
applies to "any claim before the court of appeals for which 
the state neglected to raise non-exhaustion in the district 
court." Keller v. Petsock, 853 F.2d 1122, 1128 n.6 (3d Cir. 
1988). Clearly that is not the case before us. The 
Commonwealth has aggressively asserted the 
nonexhaustion defense first in the district court and now 
on appeal. Indeed, in our most recent decisions applying 
Granberry, the state had failed to raise the nonexhaustion 
defense in the district court. See, e.g. , Smith v. Horn, 120 
F.3d 400 (3d Cir. 1997); Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, 
Delaware County, 959 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir. 1992); Keller v. 
Petsock, supra. 
 
Significantly, two changes in the federal habeas statute 
are derived from the Supreme Court's decision in 
Granberry. First, under the AEDPA, a district court may no 
longer infer that a state has waived the nonexhaustion 
defense from its failure to invoke the defense expressly. 
Gaylor v. Harrelson, 962 F.Supp. 1498, 1499 & n.2 (N.D. 
Ga. 1997). The revised statute now requires an express 
waiver through counsel in order for the state to have waived 
the nonexhaustion defense. 28 U.S.C. S 2544(b)(3). Second, 
the AEDPA, in 28 U.S.C. S 2544(b)(2), codifies the holding 
in Granberry by conferring upon the district court the 
authority to deny a habeas petition on the merits despite 
the petitioner's failure to exhaust state remedies. Hoxsie v. 
Kerby, 108 F.3d 1239, 1243 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ 
U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 126 (1997) (emphasis added). Standing 
alone, section 2544(b)(2) does not provide a standard for 
determining when a court should dismiss a petition on the 
merits rather than requiring complete exhaustion. Id. Thus, 
the court of appeals in Hoxsie read section 2544(b)(2) in 
conjunction with Granberry. We read the Granberry test as 
whether "it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not 
raise even a colorable federal claim." 481 U.S. at 135. 
 
We cannot say that it is perfectly clear that Lambert has 
not raised a colorable federal claim. The district court 
obviously found substantial merit to Lambert's claims of 
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actual innocence and prosecutorial misconduct. These 
claims present unresolved questions of fact and of state law 
and, thus, the interests of comity and justice are better 
served by requiring complete exhaustion. 
 
We note that section 2544(b)(2) does not provide the 
district court with the authority to grant relief on the merits 
where the petitioner fails to exhaust state remedies. Thus, 
a strict reading of the statute compels us to conclude that 
if a question exists as to whether the petitioner has stated 
a colorable federal claim, the district court may not 
consider the merits of the claim if the petitioner has failed 
to exhaust state remedies and none of the exceptions set 
forth in sections 2544(b)(1)(B)(I) and (ii) applies. Lambert 
argues, in contrast, that Granberry establishes that where 
the district court has held a full trial and found a 
miscarriage of justice, a failure to exhaust is excused. We 
disagree. The particular language in Granberry  to which 
Lambert refers states: 
 
       [I]f a full trial has been held in the district court and it 
       is evident that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, it 
       may also be appropriate for the court of appeals to hold 
       that the nonexhaustion defense has been waived in 
       order to avoid unnecessary delay in granting relief that 
       is plainly warranted. 
 
481 U.S. at 135. We note that, unlike in Granberry, the 
state has not waived the nonexhaustion defense. Second, 
the AEDPA now explicitly requires an express waiver by the 
state before waiver will be deemed to have occurred. 
Moreover, to accept Lambert's argument would require that 
we view Granberry as authorizing a district court to waive 
the nonexhaustion defense even though the state has 
aggressively asserted that defense at all stages of the 
proceedings. This conclusion is irreconcilable, not only with 
the express waiver provision in section 2544(b)(3), but also 
with common sense. The quoted passage from Granberry 
only has meaning when placed in the context of a case in 
which the state failed to raise the nonexhaustion defense 
before the district court. Given the new express waiver 
requirement of the AEDPA, it is doubtful that Granberry 
continues to have any import in a situation other than 
where the state has expressly waived the nonexhaustion 
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defense. We need not answer this question, however, as the 
resolution of the case before us does not require it. 
 
For these reasons, we also reject Lambert's contention 
that exhaustion is excused based on the "special 
circumstances rule" derived from Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, specifically Granberry v. Greer , supra, and 
Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).19 We agree with the 
Commonwealth that Granberry relates only to the special 
circumstance of the prosecution never having raised the 
exhaustion defense prior to appeal so that the Supreme 
Court permitted the court of appeals to rule on the merits 
of the petition. After enactment of the AEDPA in 1996, 28 
U.S.C. S 2254 imposes a duty on the courts to examine the 
exhaustion issue and to reject a petition if it raises 
unexhausted claims. 
 
Lambert's reliance on Frisbie v. Collins, supra, is likewise 
misplaced, as that decision does not support a finding of 
exceptional circumstances here.20 In Frisbie, the Supreme 
Court reiterated the general rule that the presence of 
special circumstances will excuse non-exhaustion. 324 U.S. 
at 520-21. Whether such circumstances exist is to be 
determined by the district court conducting a factual 
appraisal in each particular case. Id. at 521. The Court 
refused to discuss the special circumstances found by the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Lambert maintains before us that since she has either raised or 
waived all of her claims in state court, she did exhaust her state 
remedies. Lambert is equating exhaustion with waiver, however, in that 
she argues that since the unexhausted claims have been waived under 
Pennsylvania law, after the 1995 amendments to the PCRA, she is 
without a mechanism for post-conviction relief. This argument cannot 
form the basis of a "special circumstance" excusing her failure to 
exhaust since, as we find infra, that review of her unexhausted claims is 
not clearly foreclosed under Pennsylvania law. 
 
20. The Commonwealth submits that the so-called "special 
circumstances" exception of Frisbie v. Collins, supra, upon which 
Lambert relies to excuse nonexhaustion, "is so ill-defined that it must be 
considered sui generis" and, in any event, did not survive the AEDPA 
amendments to the federal habeas corpus statute. The Commonwealth 
describes Frisbie as "a case notably lacking in guidance on the 
parameters of the [special circumstances] exception." We agree with the 
Commonwealth's analysis of Frisbie. 
 
                                17 
  
court of appeals for the reason that the circumstances were 
so peculiar to the case that "a discussion of them could not 
give precision to the `special circumstances' rule."21 Id. at 
522. 
 
Recently, we considered the section 2544 exhaustion 
requirement with regard to a mixed petition where, as here, 
the state asserted the nonexhaustion defense in the district 
court. Christy v. Horn, 115 F.3d 201, 206 (3d Cir. 1997). 
Acknowledging the Supreme Court's strong presumption in 
favor of exhaustion, we also recognized that "in rare cases 
exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency may exist 
which permit a federal court to entertain an unexhausted 
claim." Id. at 206-07 (citations omitted). We explained that 
such circumstances exist where "state remedies are 
inadequate or fail to afford a full and fair adjudication of 
the federal contentions raised, or where exhaustion in state 
court would be `futile.' " Id. at 207 (citations omitted). 
Applying this principle in Christy, we declined to find an 
exceptional circumstance which would excuse 
nonexhaustion. We found the mere risk that the state 
courts would not stay the petitioner's execution while his 
federal constitutional claims are being litigated did not 
amount to an "unusual circumstance." The more 
appropriate inquiry, we found, was to focus on the actuality 
that state courts will refuse to stay an execution while 
federal claims are pending. Id. 
 
Applying our holding in Christy to Lambert's petition, we 
turn our attention to the actuality that the state courts 
would refuse to entertain Lambert's claims. As we discuss 
below, we cannot say with certainty that state review of 
Lambert's claims is precluded. Absent clear preclusion, we 
do not find any exceptional circumstances which would 
warrant consideration of Lambert's unexhausted claims in 
federal court. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. The petitioner in Frisbie v. Collins alleged that the complaint in the 
state court action was defective and, consequently, a faulty warrant was 
issued for his arrest. He further contends that he was subsequently 
kidnaped by Michigan police in Chicago and brought back to Michigan 
for trial in violation of federal constitutional and statutory law. 324 
U.S. 
at 521 n. 5. 
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Our conclusion is further buttressed by the holding of 
our sister court of appeals in O'Guinn v. Dutton , 88 F.3d 
1409 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, #6D6D 6D# U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 
742 (1997). There the unexhausted claim involved 
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct stemming from 
Brady violations. The court of appeals found that the state 
courts had an important interest in reviewing a serious 
constitutional claim involving the conduct of a state 
prosecutor in withholding evidence in a state trial in which 
the defendant was prosecuted for a violation of state law. 
Id. at 1412. Accordingly, the court held that the "interests 
of justice and comity [did] not weigh in favor of having [the 
federal court] decide the question." Id.  at 1413. Having 
found that the case did not present any unusual or 
exceptional circumstances, the court concluded that the 
state courts should address the prosecutorial misconduct 
claim in the first instance. Id. 
 
In contrast, we find that the cases cited by Lambert, 
Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, supra, and Moore v. 
DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1975), do not support her 
argument that special circumstances exist which would 
excuse exhaustion. It is true that in Evans we held that 
"[e]xhaustion is not a jurisdictional requirement, but rather 
a rule of comity, and a federal court may in certain 
circumstances decide the merits of a claim despite non- 
exhaustion." 959 F.2d at 1231. We elaborated on the 
circumstances which would support non-exhaustion: where 
the petitioner has no opportunity to obtain relief in a state 
court, or where the state corrective process is so deficient 
as to render any effort to obtain relief futile. Id. (citing 
Gibson v. Scheidemantel, 805 F.2d 135, 138 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
Citing Granberry v. Greer, supra, we noted further that 
non-exhaustion notwithstanding, a district court may deny 
a habeas claim on its merits if it appears unequivocally that 
the petitioner has not raised even a colorable federal claim. 
Id. We thus proceeded to consider the merits of Evans' 
claims based on our conclusion that Evans' federal due 
process claim was "the substantial equivalent of that 
presented to the state courts" and, thus, had been 
adequately exhausted. Even though the state failed to raise 
the exhaustion defense in state court, we relied on 
Granberry for the authority to reach the merits of Evans' 
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claims. We subsequently affirmed the district court's denial 
of federal habeas relief. 959 F.2d at 1237. 
 
Unlike Evans, Lambert presents numerous claims which 
are not the substantial equivalent of those presented to the 
state court in the direct appeal of her murder conviction. 
Her petition is more factually analogous to Gibson v. 
Scheidemantel, supra. There the petitioner alleged an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in state court, but he 
asserted a different basis for this claim in the state 
proceeding than that presented in his federal habeas claim. 
Consequently, we held that the petitioner had not 
exhausted his claim since the state courts could not be 
expected to consider a claim that was never made. 805 F.2d 
at 139. 
 
Nor do we find that Lambert's position is supported, as 
she contends, by our decision in Moore v. DeYoung, 515 
F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1975). There we acknowledged the 
possibility that federal habeas review to enjoin a state 
criminal proceeding prior to trial was possible despite non- 
exhaustion if "extraordinary circumstances are present." Id. 
at 443. In finding that Moore failed to present an 
" `extraordinary circumstance' which would warrant pre- 
trial, pre-exhaustion habeas corpus relief," we declined to 
define the parameters of the "extraordinary circumstances" 
exception, holding only that whatever the boundaries may 
be, Moore's petition fell outside those limits. 22 Id. at 447. 
We noted, however, that manifest shortcomings by the 
prosecutor's office and negligence in conducting Moore's 
prosecution did not "reveal that quality of delay, 
harassment, bad faith or other intentional activity which, in 
an appropriate situation, might constitute an `extraordinary 
circumstance', justifying pre-exhaustion federal habeas 
relief." Id. at 447 n. 12. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. In his petition, Moore alleged that the constitutional right to a 
speedy trial was so unique that it should bar not only a conviction but 
trial as well. This unique quality, Moore contended, constituted an 
"extraordinary circumstance." 515 F.2d at 446. 
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B. 
 
Although we discount Lambert's reliance on Granberry, 
Frisbie, Evans, and Moore to support a finding of 
exceptional circumstances sufficient to excuse 
nonexhaustion, our inquiry does not end there. As we 
stated earlier, one of the exceptional circumstances in 
which courts have dispensed with the exhaustion 
requirement is if further state litigation would be futile. 
Christy, 115 F.3d at 207. See also Twenty-Sixth Annual 
Review of Criminal Procedure, 85 Geo. L. J. 775, 1521 & n. 
2755 (1997). In making this determination, courts have 
examined the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
each petition. Id. at 1521 n. 2755. For example, the Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit found the exhaustion 
requirement excused when a recent independent decision 
by the highest state court clearly rendered appellate review 
futile. Id. (citing Allen v. Attorney General of Maine, 80 F.3d 
569, 573 (1st Cir. 1996)). Another court of appeals excused 
the exhaustion requirement when it was clear that the 
petitioner's claims would be deemed procedurally barred if 
presented in the state court. Id. (citing Grey v. Hoke, 933 
F.2d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 1991)). Some courts have been 
reluctant to apply the futility exception, however, because 
it has been criticized for potentially bypassing the state 
courts. Id. at 1522 n. 2755 (citations omitted). Most 
importantly, we recently applied our jurisprudence to hold 
that unless a state court decision exists indicating that a 
habeas petitioner is clearly precluded from state court 
relief, the federal habeas claim should be dismissed for 
nonexhaustion, even if it appears unlikely that the state 
will address the merits of the petitioner's claim. Banks v. 
Horn, 126 F.3d 206, 211 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Doctor v. 
Walters, 96 F.3d 675, 683 (3d Cir. 1996); Toulson, 987 F.2d 
at 988-89; Peoples v. Fulcomer, 882 F.2d 828, 831-32 (3d 
Cir. 1989)). 
 
In Banks, we were faced with whether the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, in death penalty cases, consistently or 
regularly bars second or subsequent PCRA petitions which 
may not meet the court's criteria for such petitions, 
"includ[ing] the existence of `a strong prima facie showing 
. . . that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred.' " 
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Banks v. Horn, 126 F.3d at 211 (citing Commonwealth v. 
Beasley, 678 A.2d 773, 771 (Pa. 1996), cert. denied, ___ 
U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1257 (1997)). We concluded, based on 
our review of Pennsylvania case law, that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court had established a practice of reaching the 
merits of claims in PCRA petitions in capital cases 
notwithstanding the failure of the petitioner to meet the 
appropriate procedural requirements. Id. at 212-13. 
Because we were not sure that the supreme court would 
change this practice after the 1995 amendments to the 
PCRA, we found that state review of Bank's unexhausted 
claims was not foreclosed. Id. at 214. 
 
In deciding Banks, we relied on Doctor v. Walters, supra, 
which involved a defendant who fled during the lunch 
recess of his criminal bench trial on the charge of 
aggravated assault following the presentation of the 
Commonwealth's case. When the defendant failed to return, 
the trial court, without informing the defendant, his 
counsel, or the Commonwealth, entered a guilty verdict 
against Doctor. Upon his capture five years later, Doctor 
was sentenced to a term of 49 to 98 months in prison. He 
filed a timely direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court which quashed the appeal without reaching the 
merits based on the fugitive forfeiture rule.23 Both the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the United States 
Supreme Court also declined to hear his appeals. In his 
federal habeas petition, Doctor raised a Sixth Amendment 
claim which had not been presented to any Pennsylvania 
court. We found that although the Pennsylvania courts 
would hold, on collateral review, that Doctor waived the 
right to assert his Sixth Amendment claim on procedural 
grounds, PCRA review was not clearly foreclosed since 
Doctor may be able to show that a " `miscarriage of justice' 
warranting `departure from the PCRA's stringent eligibility 
requirements' " has occurred. 96 F.3d at 681-82 (citation 
omitted). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. Rule 1972(6) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure 
permits a Pennsylvania appellate court to quash an appeal because the 
appellant is a fugitive. Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
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Likewise, in Toulson v. Beyer, we considered whether it 
would be futile to require the petitioner to exhaust his state 
remedies first. 987 F.2d at 986. There the defendant was 
convicted in a New Jersey court of various non-capital 
offenses. After a series of unsuccessful direct appeals to the 
New Jersey courts and the denial of his motion for post- 
conviction relief by the state trial court, Toulsonfiled a 
federal habeas petition containing unexhausted but 
procedurally barred claims in addition to exhausted claims. 
In examining pertinent New Jersey law, we found that it 
was possible that a New Jersey court may allow state 
review of otherwise procedurally barred claims based on 
one of two statutory exceptions to the procedural bar rule. 
987 F.2d at 988. Accordingly, we held that "[b]ecause no 
state court has concluded that petitioner is procedurally 
barred from raising his unexhausted claims and state law 
does not clearly require a finding of default, . .. the district 
court should have dismissed the petition without prejudice 
for failure to exhaust state remedies." Id.  at 989. Thus, our 
precedent makes clear that Lambert must exhaust her state 
remedies before she can seek federal habeas relief unless 
such an attempt would be futile. Doctor, 96 F.3d at 681 
(citing Toulson, 987 F.2d at 987). 
 
Futility may be encountered where exhaustion is 
impossible due to procedural default, i.e., the state court 
refuses to hear the merits of the claim because either (1) 
the defendant waived a PCRA claim she could have raised 
in an earlier proceeding but failed to do so; or (2) some 
other procedural bar exists, such as a statute of 
limitations. Doctor, 96 F.3d at 681. Moreover, a federal 
habeas court may excuse exhaustion because of a 
procedurally barred claim in state court "only when state 
law `clearly foreclose[s] state court review of [the] 
unexhausted claims.' Toulson, 987 F.2d at 987." Doctor, 96 
F.3d at 681. We further explained: 
 
       If the federal court is uncertain how a state court 
       would resolve a procedural default issue, it should 
       dismiss the petition for failure to exhaust state 
       remedies even if it is unlikely that the state court 
       would consider the merits to ensure that, in the 
       interests of comity and federalism, state courts are 
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       given every opportunity to address claims arising from 
       state proceedings. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 
       254, 257, 106 S.Ct. 617, 620, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986); 
       Toulson, 987 F.2d at 987. 
 
Id. We must determine, therefore, whether, in the case 
before us, Pennsylvania collateral review is "clearly 
foreclosed" such that further state proceedings are futile. 
 
C. 
 
In Pennsylvania, collateral review of a criminal conviction 
is available under the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") of 
1995, 42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. SS 9541-46 (West 1997 Supp.).24 
The scope of the relief provided under the PCRA is limited 
to "persons convicted of crimes they did not commit and 
persons serving illegal sentences . . .".25 42 Pa. Con. Stat. 
Ann. S 9542. Section 9542 further provides that the PCRA 
"shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and 
encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies 
for the same purpose that exist when [the PCRA] takes 
effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis." The 
PCRA also imposes several eligibility criteria for relief. First, 
the petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that she is, at the time relief is granted, 
currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, or is on 
probation or parole, or is awaiting execution of a death 
sentence. 42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. S 9543(a)(1). Second, the 
petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that her conviction or sentence resulted from one or more 
of seven categories of claims, only three of which are 
relevant. We paraphrase them here: 
 
        (1) The petitioner's rights under the Pennsylvania 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. The PCRA of 1995 became effective on January 16, 1996, and 
applies to postconviction petitions filed on or after that date. The PCRA 
was subsequently amended by Act No. 1997-33 (H.B. 87), effective June 
25, 1997, but the changes are irrelevant to the dispute before us. 
 
25. Because it provides a limited scope of relief, the PCRA of 1995 has 
been described as "one of the most restrictive and narrow of all the 
modern state postconviction remedies." Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., State 
Postconviction Remedies and Relief, App. A, p. 760 (1996 Ed.). 
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       Constitution or the Constitution or laws of the United 
       States were violated which, under the circumstances, 
       so undermined the truth-determining process that no 
       reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have 
       taken place. 
 
        (2) The petitioner received ineffective assistance of 
       counsel which, under the circumstances, so 
       undermined the truth-determining process that no 
       reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have 
       taken place. 
 
        (3) Exculpatory evidence, which was unavailable at 
       the time of trial, was subsequently discovered and 
       would have changed the outcome of the trial if it had 
       been introduced. 
 
42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. S 9543(a)(2)(i), (ii), and (vi). 
 
Next, the petitioner must show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the alleged error has not been previously 
litigated or waived. 42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. S 9543(a)(3). "An 
issue will be deemed previously litigated when `the highest 
appellate court in which the petitioner could have had 
review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the 
issue,' " Commonwealth v. Morales, 701 A.2d 516, 1997 WL 
578289, *1 (Pa. Sept. 17, 1997) (quoting 42 Pa. Con. Stat. 
Ann. S 9544(a)(2)), or "it has been raised and decided in a 
proceeding collaterally attacking the conviction or 
sentence." 42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. S 9544(a)(3). In her 
federal habeas petition, Lambert advances three claims 
which were previously litigated in the direct appeal of her 
conviction and sentence. Accordingly, Lambert is not 
entitled to postconviction relief on those claims under the 
PCRA and has thus exhausted her state remedies as to 
these three claims. 
 
Finally, by a preponderance of the evidence, the 
petitioner must demonstrate that the failure to litigate an 
issue previously was not the result of any rational, strategic 
or tactical decision by counsel. 42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. 
S 9544(a)(4). Neither the contentions of the parties nor the 
evidence of record suggests that Lambert's trial counsel 
strategically planned to exclude in her direct appeal some 
of the claims now raised. 
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Particularly significant to this appeal is the PCRA 
provision on waiver, which states, "an issue is waived if the 
petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before 
trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior 
state postconviction proceeding." 42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. 
S 9544(b). In this regard, the Pennsylvania courts have held 
"that nearly all claims are waived under the PCRA since 
nearly all claims potentially could have been raised on 
direct appeal. This applies even if the first-time petitioner 
never has obtained appellate review of his conviction." 
Commonwealth v. Eaddy, 614 A.2d 1203, 1207-08 
(Pa.Super. 1992), appeal denied, 626 A.2d 1155 (Pa. 1993). 
Prior to 1995, the PCRA also provided two exceptions to the 
waiver rule. If the alleged error either (1) resulted in the 
conviction of an innocent person, or (2) did not constitute 
a state procedural default barring federal habeas relief, 
then the waiver was excused. 42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. 
SS 9543(a)(3)(ii) and (iii) (West 1988). Neither of these two 
exceptions, however, is available to Lambert since her 
direct appeal was not final until after the effective date 
of the 1995 amendment to the PCRA. While Lambert 
maintains and the district court held that elimination of 
these two exceptions in the 1995 amendment effectively 
bars relief under the PCRA on all claims, we are not 
convinced that this is necessarily the case. 
 
In the past, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has allowed 
the petitioner, in limited circumstances, to overcome the 
waiver provisions where he has made a strong prima facie 
showing that a "miscarriage of justice" may have occurred. 
Commonwealth v. Lawson, 549 A.2d 107, 112 (Pa. 1988). In 
order to prevail under this theory, the petitioner must show 
either: "(a) that the proceedings resulting in[the] conviction 
were so unfair that a miscarriage of justice occurred which 
no civilized society can tolerate, or (b) that [the petitioner] 
is innocent of the crimes charged." Commonwealth v. 
Szuchon, 633 A.2d 1098, 1100 (Pa. 1993) (citing Lawson, 
549 A.2d at 112). In a concurring opinion, Justice 
Papadakos provided the following edification on 
"miscarriage of justice": 
 
       A miscarriage of justice, like prejudice, can only occur 
       where it is demonstrated that a particular omission or 
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       commission was so serious that it undermined the 
       reliability of the outcome of the proceeding. Where a 
       conviction can be shown to result from a breakdown in 
       the adversary process, the conviction rendered is 
       unreliable. Such a conviction is obviously prejudicial to 
       the defendant and, if allowed to stand, is a miscarriage 
       of justice. 
 
Lawson, 549 A.2d at 112 (Papadakos, J., concurring). 
 
Moreover, we noted in Doctor that allegations of a 
miscarriage of justice have been permitted to override the 
waiver provisions of the PCRA in the context of successive 
PCRA petitions, which was the situation in Lawson, supra. 
96 F.3d at 682 n. 6. We further noted that the 
Pennsylvania courts, however, have not addressed whether 
a showing of miscarriage of justice can be applied to 
overcome the waiver provisions in an initial PCRA petition. 
Id. In Doctor, we refused to find that collateral review was 
foreclosed since we concluded that Pennsylvania case law 
left open the possibility that a showing of miscarriage of 
justice can overcome the waiver provisions in an initial 
PCRA petition. Id. We thus concluded that a return to state 
court would not be futile. Id. at 683. 
 
In Banks, we reiterated our policy regarding review of 
waived or procedurally defaulted claims, which we originally 
stated in Toulson and applied in Doctor : 
 
       [I]n the absence of a state court decision indicating 
       that a habeas corpus petitioner is clearly precluded 
       from state court relief, the district court should dismiss 
       the claim for failure to exhaust even if it is not likely 
       that the state court will consider petitioner's claim on 
       the merits. 
 
126 F.3d at 211. We have applied this policy to all habeas 
corpus cases involving state convictions regardless of the 
sentence imposed. Whether, in fact, state case law exists 
which establishes unequivocally that state relief is 
precluded would depend on the particular facts of the case. 
Although factually Banks is distinguishable from Lambert's 
situation, the general rule of Banks governs our resolution 
of this dispute.26 Neither Lambert nor the district court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. Lambert argues our decisions in Banks and Doctor are 
distinguishable and, therefore, inapposite. Lambert attempts to 
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cites any authority to the contrary. The Commonwealth, on 
the other hand, cites several decisions in which 
Pennsylvania courts have expressed a willingness to depart 
from the PCRA's stringent waiver standards for non-capital, 
as well as capital cases, where actual innocence or manifest 
injustice is alleged. See Commonwealth v. Moss , 689 A.2d 
259, 262 (Pa.Super. 1997) (where there is a strong prima 
facie showing that a miscarriage of justice may have 
occurred in a rape conviction, court will consider the merits 
of a fifth PCRA petition); Commonwealth v. Williams, 660 
A.2d 614, 618-19 (Pa.Super. 1995), appeal denied , 674 
A.2d 1071 (Pa. 1996) (although the court denied PCRA 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
distinguish Doctor on the basis that the petitioner failed to raise in the 
state court the legal theory and facts supporting his habeas claim, and 
that we were referring to the pre-amendment PCRA when we noted the 
availability of a "miscarriage of justice" exception to the waiver rule. 
Our 
holding in Doctor is clear: Pennsylvania case law leaves "open the 
possibility that a showing of miscarriage of justice can overcome the 
waiver provisions in an initial PCRA petition." 96 F.3d at 682 n.6. In 
reaching this conclusion, we were construing the PCRA as amended in 
1995, as evidenced by our citation to the 1996 supplement and the 
language of the statute as amended in 1995. 
 
Lambert distinguishes Banks on the basis that it is a death penalty 
case with a clearly existing avenue for state court review. In a letter 
brief 
to the court dated September 30, 1997, Lambert states: 
 
       In other words, Banks, Toulson, and Doctor hold only that a 
       petitioner should be returned to state court to pursue an avenue of 
       review that clearly exists. The present case presents precisely the 
       opposite situation. Here, the avenue of state review-- indeed, the 
       very review opportunity that was available in Toulson and Doctor -- 
       has been permanently blockaded by an explicit act of the 
       Pennsylvania legislature eliminating the waiver excuses and 
       advertently sending the cases at issue, including Lambert, to 
federal 
       court where waiver excuses still exist; and the practice in death 
       sentence cases of ignoring waivers that was available in Banks is 
       inapplicable. 
 
Further, Lambert states that "where the legislature has advertently 
channeled the case at issue to federal court--the district court should 
proceed to the cause and prejudice/miscarriage of justice inquiry under 
Schlup [v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995)]." (Citing Carter v. Vaughn, 62 F.3d 
591, 595 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
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relief to a defendant who pled nolo contendere  to robbery, it 
acknowledged that Pennsylvania courts will address the 
merits of waived claims upon a showing of manifest 
injustice); Commonwealth v. Fiore, 665 A.2d 1185, 1194 
(Pa.Super. 1995), appeal denied, 675 A.2d 1243 (Pa. 1996) 
(Hoffman, J., concurring, wrote separately "to emphasize 
that there are circumstances where a departure from the 
PCRA's stringent eligibility requirements is appropriate, 
such as where there are extraordinary circumstances or a 
miscarriage of justice."). 
 
A showing of ineffective assistance of counsel may also 
excuse waiver. Morales, 701 A.2d 516, 1997 WL 578289, *2 
(citing Commonwealth v. Christy, 656 A.2d 877, 881 (Pa.), 
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 194 (1995)) (ineffective 
assistance of counsel could be a basis for post-conviction 
relief only if the defendant had a constitutional right to 
counsel in the proceeding in which he claimed 
ineffectiveness); see also Commonwealth v. Buehl , 658 A.2d 
771, 777 (Pa. 1995) (three members of a divided court 
interpreted the PCRA to require a defendant claiming 
ineffectiveness of counsel to meet a more demanding 
standard of prejudice than if he had raised this issue on 
direct appeal); Thomas M. Place, Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel Under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act, 
69 Temple L. Rev. 1389 (1996). Waiver of errors under the 
PCRA will be excused for ineffective assistance of counsel if 
the defendant had a constitutional right to counsel at the 
stage in the proceedings where counsel's ineffectiveness 
brought about the waiver. Place, supra, at 1410 (citing 
Christy, 656 A.2d at 881) (additional citation omitted). 
"Consequently, ineffectiveness of counsel will only excuse 
waiver of errors for claims where counsel is ineffective at 
trial and on direct appeal." Id. (citing Christy, supra). If the 
underlying claim was previously litigated on appeal, post- 
conviction relief is not available based on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. (citations omitted). 
Moreover, an ineffectiveness claim " `must be raised at the 
earliest stage in the proceedings at which the allegedly 
ineffective counsel is no longer representing the 
[defendant].' " Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Griffin, 644 A.2d 
1167, 1170 (Pa. 1994)). Finally, it should be noted that 
"[c]ounsel's performance in terms of waiver becomes an 
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issue only in those cases where new counsel represents the 
defendant at post-trial motions. If the new counsel does not 
preserve the issue of the trial counsel's ineffectiveness in 
post-trial motions, the new counsel waives the issue unless 
a court determines that post-trial counsel provided 
ineffective representation." Id. (footnote omitted).27 
 
Our review of Pennsylvania decisional law leads us to 
conclude that it is unclear after the 1995 amendments to 
the PCRA whether the Pennsylvania courts would allow a 
showing of miscarriage of justice to overcome the waiver 
provisions in a non-capital case upon an initial PCRA 
petition. Indeed, we have not discovered cases addressing 
this issue after the passage of the 1995 amendments. 
Accordingly, we cannot say that requiring Lambert to seek 
review of her claims in the state courts is futile. 28 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
27. Although neither party has addressed the issue of whether 
ineffectiveness of counsel excused waiver, the Commonwealth 
acknowledged in its letter brief dated September 30, 1997, Pennsylvania 
decisional law holding that "PCRA courts will consider claims which 
otherwise would be deemed waived when raised under the rubric of 
ineffective assistance of counsel." Commonwealth v. K.M., 680 A.2d 1168, 
1171 n. 8 (Pa.Super. 1996) (citing Commonwealth v. Griffin, 644 A.2d 
1167 (Pa. 1994)). Moreover, it is possible that Lambert could argue in a 
PCRA petition that second post-trial counsel provided ineffective 
representation in not raising the unexhausted claims in her direct 
appeal. Since Lambert is now represented by different counsel, arguably 
she would be raising the unexhausted claims at the earliest stage in the 
proceedings at which previous counsel provided allegedly ineffective 
representation. The uncertainty surrounding the availability of this 
exception to the waiver rule further supports dismissal of the habeas 
petition to allow the state court the opportunity to rule in the first 
instance. 
 
28. We find the district court erred in concluding that the 
Commonwealth waived the exhaustion defense when it temporarily 
conceded during the evidentiary hearing that Lambert was entitled to 
some relief. Considering the circumstances under which the concession 
was made, i.e., the Commonwealth was forced to defend the petition on 
the merits without the benefit of a ruling on its exhaustion defense prior 
to the evidentiary hearing, the fact that the Commonwealth continuously 
maintained that Lambert had failed to exhaust her state remedies at all 
stages of the proceedings, and the requirement that the waiver be 
expressly given, we cannot say the Commonwealth waived the 
exhaustion defense. 
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III. 
 
In seeking state collateral review of her nonexhausted 
claims, Lambert has several options. It is possible that 
under 42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. S 5103, Lambert may transfer 
her federal proceeding to the appropriate Pennsylvania 
court. In addition, Lambert may institute a PCRA action 
utilizing one or more of the three exceptions to the PCRA 
statute of limitations, which allows for the filing of a PCRA 
petition at the present time. We discuss these options 
briefly. 
 
A. 
 
The Pennsylvania Transfer Statute provides in pertinent 
part: 
 
       (a) General rule.--If an appeal or other matter is taken 
       to or brought in a court . . . of this Commonwealth 
       which does not have jurisdiction of the appeal or other 
       matter, the court . . . shall not quash such appeal or 
       dismiss the matter, but shall transfer the record 
       thereof to the proper tribunal of this Commonwealth, 
       where the appeal or other matter shall be treated as if 
       originally filed in the transferee tribunal on the date 
       when the appeal or other matter was first filed in a 
       court . . . of this Commonwealth. 
 
42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. S 5103(a) (West 1997 Supp.) In the 
case of actions originally filed in any United States court, 
the statute further provides: 
 
       [Section 5103(a)] shall also apply to any matter 
       transferred or remanded by any United States court for 
       a district embracing any part of this Commonwealth. In 
       order to preserve a claim under Chapter 55 (relating to 
       limitation of time), a litigant who timely commences an 
       action or proceeding in any United States court for a 
       district embracing any part of this Commonwealth is 
       not required to commence a protective action in a court 
       . . . of this Commonwealth. Where a matter is filed in 
       any United States court for a district embracing any 
       part of this Commonwealth and the matter is 
       dismissed by the United States court for lack of 
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       jurisdiction, any litigant in the matter filed may 
       transfer the matter to a court . . . of this 
       Commonwealth by complying with the transfer 
       provisions set forth in [section 5103(b)(2)]. 
 
42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. S 5103(b)(1) (West 1997 Supp.). 
 
Although the transfer act clearly applies when the 
original court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal or other 
matter, we believe it may also apply here where the district 
court dismisses a federal habeas petition for failure to 
exhaust state remedies.29 The language of section 5103(b)(1) 
indicates that a purpose of the statute is to prevent the 
barring of claims and other matters under the statute of 
limitations when the original court lacked jurisdiction over 
a matter which was timely filed. Applying the transfer act 
under the facts here would be entirely consistent with the 
purpose of the statute. 
 
We hasten to add, however, that we are not endorsing the 
application of the transfer statute in all federal habeas 
actions dismissed for nonexhaustion. Rather, we suggest 
that transfer may be appropriate where, as here, the 
district court did not originally dismiss the petition for 
failure to exhaust state remedies. Instead, the court 
prematurely proceeded to adjudicate the merits of the claim 
during which the one-year statute of limitations expired. 
Under these unique circumstances, the Pennsylvania 
transfer statute may apply and any action commenced by 
Lambert under the PCRA would be treated as filed on 
September 12, 1996, the date on which she filed her 
petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district court. 
 
B. 
 
Lambert has yet another option. The 1995 amendment to 
the PCRA enacted for the first time a one-year statute of 
limitations.30 Since the effective date of the 1995 Act is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
29. When a district court dismisses a federal habeas petition for 
nonexhaustion, it nevertheless has jurisdiction. The dismissal is based 
on principles of comity afforded state courts. 
 
30. Prior to the 1995 amendment, the PCRA did not contain a 
limitations provision for filing a PCRA petition. 
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January 16, 1996, and Lambert's direct appeal wasfinal on 
July 2, 1996, under 42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. S 9545(b)(1), 
she had until July 1, 1997 to file a PCRA petition.31 A literal 
reading of section 9545 indicates that by failing tofile a 
PCRA petition on or before July 1, 1997, Lambert may now 
be barred from filing a PCRA petition on her unexhausted 
claims. Section 9545 also contains three exceptions to the 
one-year filing requirement. Essentially, the limitations 
period will be excused where (1) the petitioner failed to raise 
the claim previously due to interference by government 
officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of 
the constitutions and laws of the United States and 
Pennsylvania; (2) the facts upon which the claim is based 
were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 
discovered through due diligence; or (3) the claim involves 
a constitutional right recognized by the Supreme Court of 
the United States or of Pennsylvania subsequent to the 
expiration of the statute of limitations and held to apply 
retroactively. 42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. S 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and 
(iii). Interestingly, the original version of the bill proposing 
the 1995 amendments to the PCRA contained a fourth 
exception to the one-year time limit which was eliminated 
before final passage. That exception would have allowed a 
waiver of the statute of limitations where "[t]here is a 
compelling need to address the claim because of a 
fundamentally unfair trial, illegal sentence or some other 
manifest injustice." H.R. 179-66, 1st Spec. Sess., at 510 
(Pa. 1995).32 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
31. Section 9545(b) states in relevant part: 
 
        (1) Any petition under [the PCRA], including a second or 
       subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the 
       judgment becomes final. . . . 
 
        (3) [A] judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, 
       including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United 
       States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration 
       of time for seeking the review. 
 
32. The debate on this amendment centered on the concerns of certain 
representatives that by providing a "manifest injustice" exception, they 
would be opening a Pandora's box for the Pennsylvania appellate courts. 
H.R. 179-66, 1st Spec. Sess., at 510 (Pa. 1995). Mr. Piccola argued that 
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The possibility exists that Lambert may be able to plead 
and prove one or more of the excuses to the statute of 
limitations. For example, Lambert has alleged in her federal 
habeas petition that she discovered certain exculpatory 
evidence after her conviction for first degree murder. 
Moreover, she cites numerous instances of alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct which, if proven, may be 
sufficient to fall within the first exception of 
unconstitutional interference by government officials. We 
note that to date, no Pennsylvania court has been asked to 
decide under what circumstances it would excuse an 
untimely PCRA petition under the new statute of limitations 
provision.33 Thus, Lambert may be able to proceed under 
the PCRA. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Pennsylvania case law does not provide guidance on what constitutes 
"manifest injustice" and cautioned against passing these words into the 
statute without defining them. Id. At 511. He further commented that 
the current bill (S.B. 81) contained adequate protection for the criminal 
defendant who finds new evidence after trial, as well as in many other 
circumstances. Id. The "manifest injustice" amendment was eventually 
defeated. Id. at 512. On the other hand, Mr. Thomas, who introduced the 
amendment, argued that "the amendment provide[d] a protective 
mechanism in situations where there is conduct that does not arise until 
way beyond the statutory period," . . . . Id.  at 510. He further 
commented that "fairness would require that we provide an . . . avenue 
of relief, in situations where individuals do not come face to face with 
conduct that has resulted in either their incarceration or their harm 
beyond that . . . statutory year that is provided for in this particular 
bill." 
Id. at 510-11. He opined that passage of the bill without the avenue of 
review provided in the amendment would cause a disservice to the whole 
judicial system. Id. at 511. 
 
33. Under the prior statute which did not contain a statute of 
limitations provision, the Pennsylvania courts were lenient in allowing 
collateral review after long delays, especially in situations involving 
ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
532 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1987) (mere delay, standing alone, may not be 
sufficient reason to reject PCRA petition summarily); Commonwealth v. 
McCabe, 519 A.2d 497 (Pa.Super. 1986) (a PCRA petition filed six years 
after the supreme court affirmed denial of his petition to set aside an 
illegal sentence was not untimely); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 502 A.2d 
195 (Pa.Super. 1985), appeal denied (1986) (unexplained delay in filing 
first PCRA petition is a factor to be considered in assessing the merits 
of 
the claims raised in the petition, but is not a basis for refusing to 
consider the claims by reason of laches and waiver). 
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IV. 
 
One final matter bears mention. Each side has brought to 
our attention serious factual issues concerning the district 
court's finding that Lambert was actually innocent of first 
degree murder. In light of our resolution of Lambert's 
petition, we need not comment on Lambert's actual 
innocence. Indeed, to do so would be to "deprive the state 
courts of an `opportunity to correct their own errors, if 
any,' " Doctor, 96 F.3d at 683 (citing Toulson, 987 F.2d at 
989), by engaging in a premature examination of the verdict 
prohibited by Congress under the AEDPA. 
 
We do not, however, diminish the obvious sense of 
outrage expressed by the prosecution nor that of the able 
district judge who heard and evaluated the evidence 
Lambert proffered. Resolution of these difficult questions 
must nonetheless await the appropriate forum for the 
constitutional balance our forefathers created to remain in 
equipoise. Accordingly, we will vacate the order of the 
district court granting the petition for writ of habeas corpus 
and remand to the district court with the direction to 
dismiss the petition without prejudice. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                35 
 
